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1.  Introduction 
 
Cash transfer programs have become the centerpiece of many Latin American countries’ 
social protection agenda. They have become popular not only as short term instruments to 
help  the  poor  cope  with  economic  shocks,  but  also  as  longer-term  poverty  alleviation 
programs  supporting  minimum  consumption  levels  and  promoting  the  accumulation  of 
human capital.  
Yet,  while  several  evaluations  have  demonstrated  the  impact  of  cash  transfers  on 
poverty reduction and human development outcomes, they do absorb an important share 
of governments’ budgets (Grosh et al., 2008; Fiszbein and Schady, 2010; World Bank-IEG, 
2011).  Most  countries  in  the  Latin  America  and  Caribbean  (LAC)  region  count  with 
conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) targeted to poor households with children that 
account for budgets up to 0.6 percent of GDP (see Table 1). Some countries in the region 
(fewer than those with CCTs) also provide cash transfers to the elderly, many of them on a 
universal (i.e. categorical) basis, that require an even more sizeable share of public budget – 
up to 1.3 percent of GDP (see Table 2). These programs can account, in a country like Brazil, 
for up to 1.7 percent of GDP, and for the average in the region, between 1 and 2 percent of 
GDP (Grosh et al., 2008). 
Resource constraints and ethical considerations have led to a heated debate on the 
scope and coverage of cash transfers. Few doubt about providing benefits to people falling 
within demonstrable categories of vulnerable groups, such as the children, the elderly or the 
disabled, though there is still an open debate on how children and the elderly compete as 
the  primary  group  to  focus  social  assistance.
2  But there is  less  consensus  on  whether 
transfers should be given to all people within  these categories (i.e. be “categorical”), or if 
they should be restricted to poor people within categories of beneficiaries (i.e. be “poverty 
targeted”).  While  poverty  targeted  transfers  are  more  cost  effective  because  limited 
resources are distributed among fewer beneficiaries, they remain more complex and costly 
to administer. And even the most sophisticated targeting systems miss some of the poor, 
                                                 
2 Some argue that political lobbying tends to favor the elderly (“the elderly can vote, the children cannot:” 
Preston, 1984). Even in countries with well-developed social assistance schemes with a family accompaniment 
approach like Brazil and Chile, public spending per older is significantly higher than public spending per child 
(Turra et al., 2011).   3 
and may have difficulties to adapt to entry and exit to and from poverty because registers of 
beneficiaries cannot be updated frequently.  
 
Table 1: Conditional Cash Transfers in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Source: Based on Fiszbein and Schady (2010). 
 
 
It is not therefore always obvious that poverty-targeted social assistance programs are the 
best  approach  to  alleviate  poverty.  At  the  heart,  the  optimal  design  relates  to  societal 
preferences for  redistribution  and  taxation  (Mkandawire,  2005),  as  well  as  tolerance  to 
exclusion errors or deviating from a “rights” approach. But the choice of design can also be 
informed by technical considerations, such as looking at the accuracy and cost effectiveness 
of different targeting mechanisms, which is the focus of this paper. 
Country Program Target Population
Amount                
(monthly US$)
Number of Beneficiaries 
(latest available)
Cost                  
(% of GDP)
Argentina Programa Familias
Household Heads, Pregant 
Females, Children <19
40-80 per child 500,000 households
Bolivia Juancito Pinto
Public school children up to 
grade 6
2 per child 500,000 households  
Brazil Bolsa Familia
Poor and extreme poor 
households




Extreme poor households 
(means-tested)
14 per child 256,000 households 0.08
Colombia Familias en Accion
Extreme poor households 
with children <7 (health), and 
with children <17 (education)
Education: 8-33 per 






Poor and extreme poor 
households with children <17
29 per household 461,000 households  
Ecuador
Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano
Households in first 2 income 
quintiles with children <17




Extreme poor households 
with children <16 in 100 rural 
municipalities




Guatemala Mi Familia Progresa
Extreme poor households 
with children <16 in 130 
municipalities







Poor households with 
children 6-12 years old up tp 
grade 4
Education: 5 per 
household; Health: 
4 per household






tested) until they graduate 
from secondary school
100 per child 100,000 households
Mexico Oportunidades









Extreme poor households 
(means-tested)
50 per household 70,000 households
Paraguay PROPAIS II
Extreme poor households 
with children <15 in rural 
areas
120 per household 5,800 households 0.08
Peru Juntos
Poor households with 
children <15
33 per household 454.000 households 0.11  4 
Table 2: Non-Contributory Social Pensions in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
Source: Murrugarra (2011). 
 
 
This paper simulates impacts of categorical and poverty targeted cash transfers on poverty 
and inequality in 13 Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and 
Peru. The simulations focus on two programs that tend to be the most widespread in the 
region: transfers to children up to five years of age, and to elderly people that are older than 
65. 
While,  by  their  nature,  poverty  targeted  transfers  always  deliver  a  higher  poverty 
impact,  both  the  incidence  of  poverty  and  the  depth  of  the  poverty  gap  appear  to  be 
important  factors  affecting  the  relative  effectiveness  of  categorical  vs.  poverty  targeted 
transfers. The comparison of transfers to children and the elderly also supports the view 
that choosing carefully categories of beneficiaries is almost as important as targeting the 
poor for achieving a high poverty impact. Overall, the findings suggest that  in the Latin 
Country Program Target Population
Transfer 
(monthly US$)
Number of Beneficiaries 
(latest available)
Cost                         
(% of GDP)
Argentina Pensiones No 
Contributivas 
Asistenciales por 
65+ without contributory 
pension and in poverty
151.5 65,900
Bolivia Renta Dignidad 
(former Bonosol)
60+, universal 22-29 782,660 1.30
Brazil Rural Pension 65+ in rural areas 342 800,000
Chile Pension Basica 
Solidaria
65+, in 3 lowest quintiles of 
income distribution
150 407,000 0.50
Costa Rica Regimen No 
Contributivo
65+ in poverty 135 53,492 0.24
Ecuador Pension Asistencial 65+ without contributory 
pension
35 502,828
El Salvador Pension Basica 
Universal
70+ in severe extreme poor 
municipalities
50 19,534





70+ in households receiving 
CCTs (Oportunidades)
22.7 80,000
Pension Alimentaria 70+ in Mexico DF, universal 63.2 470,000
Peru Gratitud 75+ without contributory 




Senior Citizen Pension 65+, income means-tested 189-472 73,110 1.30
Uruguay Beneficio No 
Contributivo
70+, Income means-tested 240 31,577
Mexico  5 
American context targeting assistance to the poor tends to deliver higher poverty impacts. 
There  are  nonetheless  circumstances  under  which  categorical  targeting  confined  to 
geographical regions may be a valid option to consider. This is particularly the case in low 
income countries with widespread pockets of poverty. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes trends in social assistance 
and the ongoing debate on categorical vs. targeted social transfers. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology used in the simulations. Section 4 presents the simulation results for the 13 
Latin American countries. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2.  The cash and targeting revolutions 
 
All over the developing world, and particularly in Latin America, social protection programs 
are moving from universal in-kind benefits and subsidies, to targeted cash transfers. The 
rationale behind the silent revolutions towards cash lies in higher welfare impacts (cash can 
support  households’  needs  beyond  food),  economic  efficiency  (e.g.,  avoidance  of  dead-
weight  losses  and  distortions  from  subsidies),  transparency  and  accountability,  and 
simplification of the administrative procedures in service delivery (Grosh et al., 2008). While 
cash transfers are far from being a panacea and should be designed in the context of a 
broader social assistance strategy that takes into account the local context and political 
economy, they undoubtedly improved in many countries both beneficiaries’ welfare and the 
cost effectiveness of social assistance programs.  
With the expansion of cash transfers, a debate has however arisen on the extent to 
which assistance should be provided to all people falling within demonstrable vulnerable 
categories (such as the children, the elderly or the disabled), or only to the poor within 
these categories. Is it optimal, and, equally important, is it ethically correct to handpick 
beneficiaries within categories? 
From  an  ethical  perspective,  many  advocate  that  social  assistance  programs  should 
favor  horizontal  equity  and  that  any  person  falling  into  a  category  that  tends  to  be 
vulnerable  should  have  the  right  to  receive  assistance  (ILO-UN  Social  Protection  Floor 
initiative, 2010). This universal view of social assistance is strengthened by three potential   6 
drawbacks of confining assistance only to poor beneficiaries within each category. First, 
poverty targeting may generate behavioral distortions and induce informality. For instance, 
poverty targeted pensions and health insurance programs financed out of general taxation 
that coexist with contributory ones may generate incentives to remain in the informal labor 
market  and  thus  avoid  contributing  to  the  system  (Levy,  2008).  Poverty  targeted  cash 
transfers may also discourage labor force participation. Second, there is no targeting system 
that can perfectly identify vulnerable individuals within a given category. Even the most 
sophisticated targeting mechanisms miss some of the poor (exclusion error), and include 
some  wealthier  individuals  (inclusion  error).  The  question  there  is  up  to  which  point  a 
society  is  ready  to  exclude  some  of  the  poor  from  assistance  because  of  efficiency 
considerations.  Finally,  potential  stigmas  related  to  poverty  targeting  may  also  affect 
participation of the most vulnerable (Grosh et al., 2008). Leite (2011) finds, for instance, 
that in Tanzania some of the elderly from rural poor villages did declare having 3 meals a 
day to avoid the stigma of being perceived as poor. 
The extent to which these drawbacks represent a strong argument against targeting still 
remains  an  open  discussion.  When  the  benefits  of  social  assistance  programs  do  not 
become disproportionate, existing studies find that labor market distortions from poverty 
targeting remain moderate (Parker and Skoufias, 2000; Skoufias and Di Maro, 2011; Fiszbein 
and  Schady,  2010;  World  Bank-IEG,  2011).  And  while  exclusion  error  may  still  be 
considerable, many categorical programs also miss some of the poor – though in lower 
proportions – because of information failures and high participation costs in remote areas 
(Barrientos, 2008; Sluchynsky, 2008). 
The categorical approach is also challenged by the reality of hard budget constraints and 
political  economy  considerations.  Countries  have  limited  resources  to  fight  poverty  and 
promote equity. Broad social assistance policies in developing countries cost  already on 
average 2 percent of GDP (Weigand and Grosh, 2008; Grosh et al., 2008), though wide 
disparities subsist across countries.
3 And even if some countries may have the fiscal space to 
expand further coverage, this can be politically costly. In general, policy discussions tend to 
center on how to improve the programs’ impact within the existing resources. 
                                                 
3 Programs focused on the elderly poor range for instance from 0.1 percent of GDP in the Seychelles to 10.6 
percent of GDP in Ethiopia. See Schwarz (2003), and Kakwani and Subbarao (2005).   7 
In  addition  to  ethical  and  political  economy  considerations,  there  are  also  technical 
arguments both in favor and against targeting. The main advantage of poverty targeting is 
to increase the amount that can be transferred to each beneficiary for a given budget, which 
maximizes the poverty impact of transfers. For instance, Grosh and Leite (2008) analyze 
cash transfer for the elderly in four countries – Yemen, Niger, Panama and Kyrgyzstan. They 
find that, despite exclusion errors, poverty targeted social pensions are much more cost-
effective per dollar spent, and, for a fixed budget, convey a higher poverty impact. On the 
other hand, however, targeting is costly. Caldes et al. (2006) and Grosh et al. (2008) find 
that administrative costs of poverty targeted conditional cash transfers (including the cost 
of collecting the data needed to construct a proxy means test and periodical reclassification 
of beneficiaries) tend to be around 10 percent of the program’s budget. In some extreme 
cases it can absorb up to 30 percent of it, which can seriously affect the ability to provide 
larger transfers. Unless targeting really delivers strong differences in impact,  categorical 
transfers should thus be considered as a valid option. 
In sum, the optimal design of programs and the extent to which to target depends very 
much  on  local  conditions  (Coady  et  al.,  2004;  Grosh  et  al.,  2008).  In  designing  a  cash 
transfers program, one must have a clear idea of the incidence of poverty among the target 
population  and  political  economy  considerations  in  favor  and  against poverty  targeting. 
How many people are poor or at risk of poverty? How many belong to the target population 
group? Where do they live? What are their characteristics? What are the causes of their 
poverty and vulnerability? And, also, which system would be subject to less local capture? Is 
there  enough  capacity  to  support  an  effective  and  transparent  targeting  system?  Only 
thereafter a clear assessment on whether and how to target can be performed. 
This  paper  abstains  from  ethical  considerations,  and  aims  at  contributing  to  the 
technical  debate.  The  objective  is  to  understand,  by  means  of  simulations,  gains  from 
poverty targeting in Latin America with respect to simpler categorical targeting. In doing so, 
it also provides some guidance on circumstances under which targeting may bring more 
benefits. It does not provide however a definitive answer for three reasons. First, because 
simulations are done for 13 countries only – too few to conduct a statistical meta analysis. 
Second, because the simulations do not consider behavioral changes of beneficiaries that 
could alter labor market decisions and poverty status. Third, and more importantly, because   8 
there is no clear-cut answer to the question, which depends very much on budget, societal 
preferences and political economy considerations. 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
 
In what follows, we look first at the impact on poverty and inequality of poverty-targeted 
and  categorical  cash  transfers  to  children  up  to  five  years  of  age.  We  then  repeat  the 
exercise  for  social  pensions  to  elderly  people  of  age  65  and  higher,  and  conclude  by 
comparing  the  two.  Our  workhorse  simulation  consists  of  a  hypothetical  cash  transfer 
program that transfers an amount equal to 0.5 percent of GDP to a reference group (i.e. 
children or the elderly). The amount was chosen to strike a balance between  large CCT 
programs such as Oportunidades or Bolsa Familia that transfer around 0.3 - 0.4 percent of 
GDP, and more costly social pensions programs that in some countries transfer up or even 
more than one percentage point of GDP. In choosing a common metric, we will be better 
able to compare the poverty impact of both types of programs. 
The simulations run as follows. For the targeted variant, we consider all households that 
meet the categorical criteria, and that have a gross income below USD 2.5 a day in per 
capita  terms  (an  international  widely  used  poverty  line).  In  the  literature,  this  group  is 
referred to as the extreme poor. In 2010 the extreme poor consisted on average of 15 
percent of the Latin America population (World Bank, 2010), and is the main beneficiary of 
social assistance programs. To estimate the size of the transfer, we then allocate 0.5 percent 
of GDP in equal shares to all beneficiaries (if there are 2 beneficiaries in one household, we 
give twice the transfer). To allow comparisons across countries, all simulations are done in 
2005 PPP US Dollars. For the categorical variant, we repeat the same exercise but consider 
all households meeting the categorical criteria regardless of their poverty status. Having 
allocated the funds, we re-calculate for both variants households’ poverty status. 
Our  estimations  are  based  on  several  assumptions.  First,  we  assume  there  are  no 
behavioral changes, in particular that the program has no impact on labor market decisions 
and poverty status. The current evidence suggests that labor market distortions of cash 
transfer programs remain moderate, and we do not expect results to change dramatically if 
behavioral  responses  were  considered.  Second,  the  impact  of  a  national  program  can   9 
change substantially by urban and rural areas, and hence in a robustness exercise we discuss 
the  impacts  by  geographical  areas  separately.  Finally,  the  basic  simulations  neglect 
considerations related to the effectiveness of targeting, and assume that our hypothetical 
program  is  able  to  perfectly  target  the  poor.  To  address  this  issue,  we  also  discuss  a 
simulation where we assume that targeting has 15 percent higher administrative costs than 
categorical transfers (so that the targeted program only distributes 0.425 percent of GDP), 
and that exclusion errors lead to missing 30 percent of the (randomly selected) poor, who 
do not receive the transfer. 
Observe, also, that we look at the poverty and inequality impact of programs that are in 
addition to the ones that are already implemented. Ideally, it would be preferable to first 
subtract from households’ income all transfers that they already receive, and subsequently 
add our transfer from the hypothetical program. In doing so, it would be possible to provide 
an idea on the extent to which the coverage of current programs could be improved to 
enhance cost effectiveness. Unfortunately, we only have limited and imperfect data about 
the amounts transferred to households in each country survey. We chose therefore not to 
explore that avenue. 
The simulations are based on household surveys from 13 Latin American countries that 
have  been  collected  and  harmonized  as  part  of  the  Socio-Economic  Database  for  Latin 
America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), a partnership between the Center for Distributive, 
Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS) and The World Bank. The list of countries and of surveys 
used is shown in Annex 1. The analysis uses the income aggregates provided in SEDLAC, 
which we convert in 2005 USD PPP. 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
Children 
We begin by looking at the poverty and inequality impact of targeted and categorical cash 
transfers programs to families with children up to 5 years of age. Several features emerge. 
First, we can observe a relationship between income per capita, and the effectiveness of the 
program in reducing poverty under both the targeted and untargeted modality. The same   10 
program (if implemented ideally) is more than twenty times more effective in reducing 
poverty rates in Argentina than in Nicaragua under both modalities, and eight times more 
effective in reducing the poverty gap. Without even considering implementation issues, it is 
thus far easier to achieve a poverty impact in wealthier countries than in poorer ones. Two 
main reasons stand out: transfers remain higher in wealthier countries because of larger 
budgets available, making it easier to lift people above USD2.5 dollars a day: 0.5 percent of 
GDP corresponds to an average of 715 USD per capita (in PPP terms) in 2008 in Argentina, 
but only to 134 USD per capita in Nicaragua. In addition, wealthier countries also display 
lower poverty rates and a lower proportion of children in the population, and therefore, 
under the targeted modality, a higher budget is distributed among fewer beneficiaries. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Extreme Poverty Rates - Children 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
 
Figure 2: Changes in Poverty Gap  - Children 
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Figure 3: Changes in the Gini coefficient  - Children 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
Second, targeted programs are, on average, 3.2 times more effective in reducing poverty 
rates (and 2.3 more effective in reducing the poverty gap) than categorical programs. There 
is,  however,  considerable  variation  across  countries:  in  Nicaragua,  a  perfectly  targeted 
program would only be 2 times more effective in reducing poverty rates than a categorical 
one, while in Colombia (the other extreme) this ratio jumps to 7.1. These differences are not 
explained by income levels alone: effectiveness in Nicaragua and Argentina, two countries 
with very different income levels, is for instance very similar. Rather, differences in impact 
depend on a more complex combination of factors, such as how widespread are pockets of 
poverty  with  people  far  off  the  poverty  line.  In  Colombia,  not  only  poverty  is  more 
widespread, but the poverty gap is twice as much as in Argentina. That implies the need of 
higher transfer levels to the poor to lift them out of poverty, hence a categorical transfer, 
which dilutes available resources among more beneficiaries, remains less effective.  
Targeted  programs  are  also  much  more  effective  in  reducing  income  inequality.  On 
average, in our sample, a categorical transfer of 0.5 percent of GDP to children reduces the 
Gini coefficient by 1.4 percent, against 2.6 percent for a targeted program. However, in 
contrast with poverty, there is little connection between the initial level of inequality, and 
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Elderly 
Next, we turn attention to social pensions given to beneficiaries of age 65 and older (Figures 
4  to  6).  Observe  that  some  countries  in  the  sample  have  already  in  place  large  and 
widespread  contributory  and  non-contributory  pensions  systems  (Argentina,  Brazil,  and 
Chile) that have already dramatically lowered poverty among the elderly to reach less than 5 
percent of this demographic group. In these countries, it makes little sense to compare the 
effectiveness of categorical vs. targeted programs, and we have therefore excluded them 
from the analysis. 
 
Figure 4: Changes in Extreme Poverty Rates - Elderly 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
 
Figure 5: Changes in Poverty Gap - Elderly 
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Figure 6: Changes in the Gini Coefficient - Elderly 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
The first, striking contrast with respect to transfers to children is that in all countries (with 
the exception of Nicaragua, and under some circumstances Guatemala), both targeted and 
categorical transfers to the elderly have a significantly lower impact on poverty than an 
equivalent  program  for  children.  The  difference  in  poverty  impact  is  large:  on  average, 
categorical  transfers  to  children  are  1.6  times  more  effective  in  reducing  poverty  than 
categorical  transfers  of  equal  budget  to  the  elderly,  and  targeted  transfers  twice  more 
effective. The reasons are straightforward: poverty rates among the elderly are, on average, 
lower  than  for  children;  and  poorer  families  have  more  children,  but  not  more  elderly 
people. The simulations  also suggest that the common belief that cash transfers to the 
elderly can reduce substantially poverty by trickling down to all family members has limited 
validity:  with  fewer  elderly  than  children  living  in  poor  households,  for  the  trickledown 
effect to be effective money should be transferred across family members living in different 
households, a much less likely event.  
There is nevertheless considerable variation across countries in the poverty impact of 
transfers to the elderly. The maximum reduction in poverty rates (close to 20 percent) is 
achieved, as expected, in countries with high poverty incidence among the elderly, such as 
Mexico and Colombia. Effectiveness of a targeted program as opposed to a categorical one 
also  varies  substantially  across  countries,  being  0.7  times  higher  in  Nicaragua,  to  1  in 
Guatemala, to 2 in Colombia and 3.2 times in Costa Rica, and 2.8 percent on average across 
countries.  Similar  conclusions apply  for  the  reduction  in poverty  gaps  (poverty  targeted 
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In  addition  to  lower  impacts  on  poverty,  transfers  to  the  elderly  have  also  a  lower 
impact on inequality than transfers to children. While, on average, targeted transfers to 
poor children reduce income inequality by 2.6 percent on average, the same amount of 
resources targeted to the elderly poor reduces income inequality by 1.7 percent. Again, 
poverty-targeted transfers are more effective in reducing income inequality than categorical 
ones across countries (2.3 times more on average), though the difference is less pronounced 
in Costa Rica and Mexico. 
 
Cost-effectiveness of categorical vs. targeted programs 
The previous section deals with the extent to which, for a given budget, targeted programs 
are more effective in reducing poverty and inequality. But the reverse question is also of 
interest: how much would it cost to achieve the same poverty impact of a targeted program 
using a categorical one? To address this question, we proceed as follows. For a categorical 
program to achieve the same poverty impact than a targeted one, it must transfer the same 
amount of resources but to all beneficiaries – not simply poor ones. With this simple rule in 
mind, we look at the cost-effectiveness of categorical vs. targeted cash transfers, which is 
summarized in Figure 7. 
In  all  countries  under  consideration,  a  targeted  cash  transfer  can  achieve  the  same 
poverty impact than a categorical one using from 2 to 13 times less resources. The large 
difference in costs suggest that in most countries some form of targeting, even if costlier 
and  far  from  perfect,  can  lead  to  large  efficiency  gains  and  allow  for  more  generous 
transfers  to  the  poor.  Efficiency  gains  show,  however,  strong  heterogeneity  across 
countries,  with  poorer  countries  demonstrating  lower  gains  than  wealthier  ones,  from 
around 2 in Nicaragua, Bolivia and Guatemala to around 7 in Argentina and Costa Rica, to 13 
in Chile. In all cases, the cost-effectiveness of targeted interventions is even greater for 
transfers to the elderly than for children. The heterogeneity seems to have a direct link to 
the fact that wealthier countries have fewer poor people, and therefore, for a given overall 
budget, they can transfer a significantly larger amount of resources to a narrower set of 
people under targeted programs. 
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Figure 7: Cost-effectiveness of targeting 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
 
The heterogeneity in efficiency gains also suggests that targeting methods should vary by 
country. For instance, in low income countries with widespread poverty, implementing a 
sophisticated proxy means test (PMT) may lead to high costs and strong implementation 
challenges without being necessarily much more effective than simpler targeting based on 
categorical and geographic exclusion restrictions. In contrast, in wealthier countries, unless 
pockets  of  poverty  show  strong  geographical  concentration,  implementing  a  more 
sophisticated  targeting  mechanism  (such  as  proxy-means  or  means-tested  mechanisms) 
could lead to large efficiency gains. In these countries, stronger implementation capacity 
could  also  better  resolve  some of the  technical  implementation  challenges  that  lead  to 
exclusion errors. 
 
Imperfect targeting and administrative costs 
These  basic  simulations  miss  an  important  feature.  Actual  poverty  targeting,  means  or 
proxy-means  tested,  is  costly  and  far  from  being  perfect.  As  a  robustness  exercise,  we 
simulate therefore the impact of an “imperfect” poverty-targeted program to children. To 
do so, we presume that the targeted program spends 15 percent more than the categorical 
program in administrative costs (so that 15 percent less resources are being transferred to 
the beneficiaries), and that exclusion errors lead to missing 30 percent of the extremely 
poor (randomly selected among potential beneficiaries). For comparison purposes, we also 
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missing 10 percent of the poor.
4 These assumptions are in line with  what is suggested by 
targeting evaluations of transfer programs in the region (Fiszbein and Schady, 2010). 
Figure  8  presents the poverty impact s of the various variants . In all countries, the 
imperfectly  targeted  program  continues  to  deliver  a  better  poverty  impact  than  the 
categorical programs. The impact remain in fact closer to the perfectly poverty targeted 
program,  than  to  the  categorical  ones.  Nevertheless,  in  countries  where  differences 
between targeted and  categorical  systems were already small, the attractiveness of a 
categorical  program with respect to a n  imperfectly targeted one  has now increased: in 
Nicaragua, for instance,  a  categorical  program only achieves  almost the same  poverty 
reduction than an imperfectly targeted program that costs the same  – but does not “miss” 
30 percent of the extreme poor. In contrast, in wealthier and more unequal countries, such 
as Colombia, the need to transfer higher amounts to a fewer pool of poor beneficiaries 
makes an imperfectly targeted system still an attractive option. 
 
Figure 8: Imperfect targeting and administrative costs (children only) 
 




Some countries do not target beneficiaries using an absolute poverty line, but a relative one, 
in which case transfers are targeted to people below a certain percentile, rather than those 
                                                 
4 To keep the budget at 0.5 percent of GDP, under the categorical variant of the simulation we distribute all 
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below  a  particular  income  threshold.  Accordingly,  we  simulate  the  poverty  impact  of  a 
program that targets the poorest income quintile, and compare the results with a program 
that targets the population below 2.5 USD per day. 
 
Figure 9: Relative targeting (children only) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
The poverty impact of targeting the poorest quintile varies dramatically according to the 
poverty headcount and gap of each country. In Peru and Ecuador, where extreme poverty 
incidence among children is close to 20 percent, the two approaches are equivalent. In cases 
where poverty incidence is lower than 20 percent, a relative targeting would still reach all 
poor, but will dilute the average transfer due to the inclusion of non-poor beneficiaries. The 
resulting lower average transfer would imply that some of the poor will not be able to be 
lifted out of poverty. The lowest poverty impact in targeting the poorest quintile is however 
in countries with widespread pockets of poverty exceeding 20 percent, and in countries that 
have large poverty gaps, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala and Bolivia. In these cases, targeting 
the bottom quintile misses the beneficiaries who remain close to the poverty line, hence the 
transfers lift very few (or no) beneficiaries out of poverty. At the same time, however, the 
transfers reach more generously the poorest beneficiaries that remain far from the poverty 
line. It is not possible to assess, from a welfare perspective, which modality delivers higher 
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significantly the profile of beneficiaries, and hence how to target should be at the center of 
the discussion when discussing a program’s objectives. 
 
Alternative age groups 
All simulations assume that the targeted beneficiaries are children 0 to 5 years old, and 
elderly who are 65 years old or more. This section investigates whether slightly changing the 
eligibility age profiles can affect the poverty impact of the program. It is to be expected that 
the poverty impact will be affected only if the poor are concentrated in specific age or 
profile groups. 
Figure 10 explores alternative age group definitions for children (it considers children 0 
to 2 and 2 to 5 separately), to check if the poverty impact changes significantly by narrowing 
the  age  groups.  With  the  exception  of  the  Dominican  Republic,  the  age  group  under 
consideration for a categorical transfer does not seem to alter significantly the results. This 
suggests that, overall, the distribution of income across age groups of children is such that 
providing  higher  transfers  to  a  narrower  group  delivers  a  similar  poverty  impact  than 
delivering  lower  transfers  to  a  wider  group.  In  all  cases,  the  poverty  impact  under 
categorical targeting remains lower than under the targeted modality. 
 
Figure 10: Poverty impact targeting different age groups (children only) 
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Geographic targeting 
The poverty impacts of targeted vs. categorical programs may also vary geographically, for 
instance between urban and rural areas. Figures 11 and 12 present the differential poverty 
impact of a national program in urban and rural areas that transfers equal amounts to 
beneficiaries in both regions. Overall, despite the poverty incidence being on average three 
times higher in rural areas, there appears to be surprisingly little differences in program’s 
impact between rural and urban areas. In fact, a few results may appear counter intuitive at 
first sight, and we discuss them next. 
In  many  countries,  both  categorical  and  targeted  transfers  achieve  greater  poverty 
reduction in urban than in rural areas. This is because, independently of poverty incidence 
levels, the poverty gap is smaller in urban areas (poverty gaps in rural areas are on average 
3.5 times higher), hence, equal amounts transferred to beneficiaries achieve greater poverty 
reduction in urban areas. However, aside from Bolivia where the same targeted program 
achieves  twice  as  much  poverty  reduction  in  urban  than  in  rural  areas,  differences  in 
poverty impact remain fairly modest, from 1.6 times in Nicaragua to 0.9 times in Colombia. 
This suggests that, on average, benefits ought not to differ much between urban and rural 
areas, though they could be slightly higher in rural areas. 
 
Figure 11: Impact on urban areas (children only) 
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Figure 12: Impact on rural areas (children only) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on SEDLAC databases 
 
The lower poverty gap in urban areas also provides an explanation of why targeted transfers 
do not necessarily perform better in urban than in rural areas, despite the lower poverty 
incidence. In fact, the picture remains quite heterogeneous. In Nicaragua, where two thirds 
of the population in rural areas lives in extreme poverty (against a quarter in urban areas), 
targeting performs much better in urban than in rural areas: in urban areas, it achieves 2.7 
times higher poverty reduction than a categorical program, as opposed to only 1.7 times in 
rural  areas.  But  in  Panama,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  spectrum,  poverty  targeting 
performs way better in rural areas. This is because the poverty gap in urban areas remains 
so small (2.3 against 12 in rural areas), that even a “diluted”  categorical transfer would 
achieve massive poverty reduction. In contrast, targeted transfers in rural areas perform 
way  better  because  they  allow  to  transfer  higher  resources  to  the  poor,  and  hence  to 
overcome more easily the higher poverty gap. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
From a theoretical perspective, targeting social assistance to the poor always improves the 
programs’  poverty  impact  since,  for  a  given  budget,  targeted  programs  transfer  more 
resources to fewer beneficiaries. However, the extent to which these gains are substantial 
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question. The findings suggest that the incidence of poverty is key, but not the only factor 
affecting  the  relative  effectiveness  of  targeted  vs.  categorical  transfers.  The  rural-urban 
analysis strengthens the view that the relative effectiveness depends on a variety of factors, 
in particular the depth of the poverty gap: if it is relatively low, the difference in poverty 
impact of categorical vs. targeted transfers may not be that large.  
The comparison of programs for children and the elderly also supports the view that 
choosing carefully the beneficiaries is almost as important as targeting to achieve poverty 
reduction. The simulations show that because, overall, there are less elderly than children 
who are poor, for given resources social assistance programs to the elderly achieve a lower 
poverty impact – even if they are poverty targeted. This does not necessarily call for phasing 
out  social  pensions,  but  for  a  rebalancing  of  the  budget  of  social  assistance  programs 
towards the largest vulnerable groups. 
Overall,  the  findings  support  the  view  that  in  the  Latin  American  context  targeting 
assistance  to  the  poor  tends  to  deliver  higher  poverty  impacts.  There  are  nonetheless 
circumstances  under  which  simpler  schemes,  such  as  categorical  cash  transfers  for 
vulnerable  groups  that  are  geographically  confined  to  regions  with  strong  pockets  of 
poverty, may be a valid option to consider as an alternative to means tested or proxy means 
tested  programs.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  low  income  countries  with  widespread 
pockets of poverty. 
We  would  like  to  conclude  with  a  note  of  caution.  To  achieve  comparability  across 
countries, the simulations abstained from looking at country specific factors that ought to 
be considered in the design of effective social assistance programs. Among these are more 
precise  identifications  of  vulnerable  groups  and  of  geographic  differences.  The  results 
should thus be taken as they are – a suggestive cross country comparison with no ambition 
to provide guidance for specific countries, which ought to include more country specific 
factors.   22 
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Appendix 
 
Annex 1: Household surveys 
Country  Year  Survey 
Observations 
(Households) 
Argentina  2009  Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
Continua 
27,842 
Bolivia  2007  Encuesta de Hogares  4,148 
Brazil  2009  Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicilios 
129,333 
Chile  2009  Encuesta de Caracterización 
Socioeconómica Nacional 
71,460 
Colombia  2009  Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares  112,102 
Costa Rica  2009  Encuesta de Hogares de Propósitos 
Múltiples 
13,244 
Ecuador  2009  Encuesta de Empleo y Subempleo y 
Desempleo 
19,435 
Guatemala  2006  Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de 
Vida 
13,686 
México  2008  Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y 
Gastos de los Hogares 
29,468 
Nicaragua  2005  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Medición de Nivel de Vida 
6,884 
Panamá  2009  Encuesta Continua de Hogares  13,386 
Perú  2009  Encuesta Nacional de Hogares- 
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Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 8.34 6.01 8.10 3.26 7.83
P1 3.49 2.25 3.37 1.40 3.29
P2 2.20 1.33 2.11 0.92 2.07
P0 16.86 14.21 16.33 12.14 16.34
P1 6.90 5.17 6.68 3.74 6.59
P2 4.07 2.80 3.93 1.89 3.86
Gini 45.84 44.61 45.50 43.81 46.19
2,658.6          2,658.6          2,658.6          2,658.6         
2,268,498 2,531,433 326,361 36,797
3.21 2.88 22.32 197.95
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 33.34 32.34 32.60 30.49 30.92
P1 14.48 13.63 14.09 12.60 13.48
P2 9.15 8.40 8.89 7.54 8.52
P0 50.40 49.93 49.99 50.40 49.84
P1 25.14 24.35 24.60 23.86 24.08
P2 16.03 15.23 15.63 14.45 15.11
Gini 57.19 56.76 56.92 56.40 56.57
189.0              189.0              189.0              189.0             
1,347,935 576,899 581,007 145,778
0.38 0.90 0.89 3.55
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 










Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 15.02 13.06 14.86 9.39 14.40
P1 6.90 5.54 6.78 3.82 6.63
P2 4.70 3.49 4.57 2.44 4.49
P0 27.53 26.14 27.21 26.44 26.92
P1 12.40 10.87 12.22 9.34 12.00
P2 7.81 6.43 7.67 4.95 7.51
Gini 53.74 53.28 53.58 52.78 53.57
9,118.8          9,118.8          9,118.8          9,118.8         
16,181,389 15,087,966 4,971,594 421,067
1.54 1.66 5.03 59.33
Brazil
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 




Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 4.25 3.39 3.99 2.10 3.56
P1 1.61 1.22 1.50 0.86 1.40
P2 0.98 0.72 0.91 0.56 0.87
P0 11.72 10.13 11.10 9.59 11.02
P1 3.84 3.14 3.62 2.56 3.45
P2 2.03 1.59 1.90 1.20 1.79
Gini 51.94 51.23 51.51 50.95 51.66
1,105.9          1,105.9          1,105.9          1,105.9         
1,362,349 1,831,181 101,987 38,906





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 





Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 8.09 7.08 7.66 4.17 6.88
P1 3.57 2.94 3.24 1.95 2.99
P2 2.38 1.89 2.06 1.39 1.95
P0 19.61 17.83 18.51 16.98 18.52
P1 7.19 6.27 6.70 4.90 6.39
P2 4.20 3.53 3.83 2.54 3.59
Gini 50.21 49.65 49.87 49.17 49.77
230.9              230.9              230.9              230.9             
410,092 330,723 58,776 28,524





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 
Transfer per beneficiary (2005 US$ Daily)
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 16.11 14.63 15.35 10.73 13.43
P1 7.23 6.28 6.55 4.40 5.71
P2 4.73 3.95 4.09 2.77 3.61
P0 29.95 28.37 29.05 29.27 28.44
P1 13.15 12.01 12.38 10.37 11.39
P2 8.15 7.20 7.45 5.56 6.66
Gini 56.02 55.51 55.75 54.96 55.23
1,883.5          1,883.5          1,883.5          1,883.5         
4,807,219 2,962,392 1,109,547 524,883




Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Colombia
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 





Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 16.37 14.42 15.31 9.73 13.72
P1 4.82 3.87 4.48 2.51 3.98
P2 2.09 1.57 1.92 0.99 1.71
P0 34.66 33.14 33.25 33.73 32.66
P1 12.59 11.37 11.92 9.93 11.15
P2 6.24 5.34 5.85 4.13 5.34
Gini 48.86 48.03 48.42 47.34 47.89
386.4              386.4              386.4              386.4             
1,000,142 692,105 249,589 74,183





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 
Transfer per beneficiary (2005 US$ Daily)
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 19.17 17.46 18.08 13.55 16.00
P1 7.56 6.62 7.08 4.88 6.26
P2 4.48 3.77 4.12 2.71 3.66
P0 37.21 35.94 36.20 37.00 35.73
P1 15.36 14.18 14.64 12.90 13.67
P2 8.86 7.91 8.33 6.48 7.56
Gini 48.93 48.28 48.61 47.57 47.94
511.4              511.4              511.4              511.4             
1,386,874 1,253,728 364,580 204,886
1.01 1.12 3.84 6.84
Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 









Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 33.83 32.82 32.98 31.58 31.53
P1 14.35 13.38 13.78 12.17 13.02
P2 8.12 7.28 7.70 6.31 7.23
P0 53.37 52.73 52.69 53.37 52.82
P1 25.49 24.57 24.87 24.06 24.20
P2 15.65 14.74 15.11 13.87 14.46
Gini 55.85 55.25 55.50 54.80 55.03
272.2              272.2              272.2              272.2             
2,086,598 616,632 901,217 179,004
0.36 1.21 0.83 4.17
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 13.96 11.61 12.74 6.96 11.32
P1 5.59 4.37 4.89 2.71 4.46
P2 3.35 2.47 2.87 1.59 2.67
P0 28.74 25.99 27.15 25.76 26.59
P1 11.36 9.70 10.35 7.59 9.73
P2 6.53 5.29 5.81 3.66 5.38
Gini 50.52 49.44 49.88 48.56 49.45
7,153.3          7,153.3          7,153.3          7,153.3         
11,633,955 7,189,108 2,393,781 1,120,543
1.68 2.73 8.19 17.49
Mexico
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 




Poverty line of US$2.5 





Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 42.52 41.92 41.90 41.30 40.86
P1 17.65 16.95 17.24 16.33 16.55
P2 9.79 9.20 9.49 8.69 9.02
P0 63.30 63.12 62.80 63.30 63.26
P1 31.11 30.50 30.65 30.27 30.27
P2 19.14 18.51 18.75 18.08 18.23
Gini 52.26 51.86 52.01 51.56 51.61
63.3                63.3                63.3                63.3               
663,747 270,890 342,936 86,167





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 
Transfer per beneficiary (2005 US$ Daily)
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 15.99 13.53 14.73 7.65 13.00
P1 5.76 4.28 5.19 2.34 4.62
P2 3.02 2.05 2.68 1.17 2.43
P0 29.58 27.87 28.31 27.79 27.32
P1 12.25 10.49 11.39 8.21 10.53
P2 6.80 5.39 6.21 3.61 5.63
Gini 52.09 50.96 51.56 50.10 50.99
205.2              205.2              205.2              205.2             
370,654 282,508 92,402 36,492





Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 
Transfer per beneficiary (2005 US$ Daily)  31 
 
Children Elderly Children Elderly
P0 19.52 17.83 18.48 14.26 16.31
P1 6.93 5.75 6.40 3.91 5.72
P2 3.43 2.59 3.12 1.60 2.82
P0 34.99 33.89 34.17 34.94 33.54
P1 14.68 13.44 14.00 12.20 13.09
P2 8.10 7.02 7.60 5.63 6.94
Gini 48.03 47.18 47.63 46.51 46.97
1,143.7          1,143.7          1,143.7          1,143.7         
3,751,466 2,517,343 1,199,495 421,194




Poverty line of US$2.5 
Poverty line of US$4
Peru
Annual Cost (in Millions)
Number of beneficiaries 
Transfer per beneficiary (2005 US$ Daily)